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The relationship between environmental law and private law has long been controversial 
and unhappy. Environmental lawyers have often been suspicious of private law, seeing it as 
steeped in individualism and as not committed to basic collective principles such as the 
polluter-pays and precautionary principles. In return, private lawyers have tended to see 
environmental law as a disturbing mélange of different types of law, devoted not to 
upholding rights and providing justice between the parties but to politically determined 
policy goals. The two sides seem to agree on only one thing: that environmental law and 
private law do not mix and should as far as possible be isolated from each other.1 The image 
presented by both sides is of a fixed and antagonistic relationship, an image further dogged 
by stereotypes and overgeneralizations, for example about differences between the 
common law and civil law. 
The purpose of this chapter is not to contribute directly to the controversy, or indeed to 
the unhappiness, surrounding the relationship between environmental law and private 
law—although it is worth noting that the balance of the debate has shifted again towards 
recognizing the importance of private law in the development of environmental controls, at 
least as long as private law claimants are themselves driven by concern for the 
environment.2 Its purpose instead is to describe the variety that exists across different legal 
systems in how the two relate to each other. In doing so, it hopes to widen the range of 
solutions and techniques available to lawyers in different jurisdictions. It is an exercise not in 
developing a definitive answer to the question of how environmental law and private law 
should interact but in preparing a catalogue of the ways in which they might interact. Before 
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2 What Is Private Law? 
 
One of the most important lessons of comparative law is that unless handled with care legal 
transplants can cause trouble.3 The very concept of ‘private law’ is such a transplant. Its 
origin is in Roman law. As the Institutes say:4 
Huius studii duae sunt positiones, publicum et privatum. publicum ius est quod 
ad statum rei Romanae spectat, privatum quod ad singulorum utilitatem 
pertinet. dicendum est igitur de iure privato, quod tripertitum est; collectum 
est enim ex naturalibus praeceptis aut gentium aut civilibus. 
The concept of private law, for the most part stripped of any reference to ius gentium and 
ius naturale, passed into those modern legal systems heavily influenced by Roman law, 
particularly the French and the German systems, in which the jurisdictional structure of the 
courts reinforces the distinction between private and public law. Lawyers and philosophers 
from other systems, particularly systems derived from English law, have long found the 
distinction difficult. Lacking separate courts for public and private law litigation and, more 
importantly, lacking a clear theory of the state and so a distinct idea of public law,5 many of 
them struggle to make sense of private law as a category.6 They confuse it with common 
law as opposed to statutory law, worry that use of the word ‘private’ implies a claim that 
the state is somehow not involved in private law, and resort to arguments aimed at 
establishing not that private law is a distinct category but rather that it ought to be.7 
This not to say that all the definitions of private law used in Roman law-derived systems 
are themselves satisfactory. The idea, for example, that private law comprises all the legal 
rules that derive from recognising the principle of individual autonomy or freedom of the 
will, an idea prominent in German legal thought, at least in twentieth-century 
interpretations of nineteenth-century debates,8 if taken literally would artificially restrict 
the range of what can count as private law. For example, strict liability torts might not 
obviously derive from the concept of individual autonomy. 
Another approach might be to say that individual autonomy is important to private law, 
marking it out from other forms of law, in a different way: not so much in the properties of 
the rules themselves, which may or may not have a basis in the concept of freedom of the 
will, as in what individuals can do with them. In private law, on this point of view, individuals 
can choose to press their claims or to drop them or to settle them as they wish. But this 
approach has its own flaws. The ability to press or drop claims is not excluded from other 
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victims, and exceptionally some still do, even for murder.9 Moreover, public law litigants can 
choose to press or drop their claims, even though limitations might exist on their ability to 
settle (e.g. accepting money in settlement of claim that a public authority lacked the power 
to make a decision suffers from the inherent defect that a claimant’s agreement cannot 
create a power that does not exist). 
Furthermore, any attempt to derive the content of private law from the value of 
freedom or autonomy can be criticized as an unnecessarily ideological exercise. As those 
who worked on the European Private Law Draft Common Frame of Reference recognized, 
private law is capable of responding to a wide range of principles and values, which they 
grouped under the headings freedom, security, justice, and efficiency.10 Despite the hopes 
and fears of some writers,11 no necessary connection exists between the mere existence of 
private law and any specific political programme. On the contrary, private law rules can be 
designed that further or complement a wide variety of political or policy goals. 
The conclusion that private law can be used for a variety of purposes, however, is not 
without its own critics. Some writers object to the very idea of designing private law rules to 
achieve public policy goals,12 and many of these writers also object to public policy-making 
by judges.13 These authors, however, either openly acknowledge that they are engaged in a 
normative rather than an analytical exercise, with its own essentially ideological purpose of 
isolating private law from politics, or else claim to be setting out an ‘interpretation’ of the 
existing law in a very limited range of jurisdictions, usually England or the United States.14 
The point about the capability of courts is separate, but seems to confuse private law with 
common law. The limitations of judges as makers of public policy do not apply to legislators, 
and so cannot be used to criticize the provisions of statutes or codes. 
For comparative purposes we should aim as far as possible to avoid the twin traps of 
parochialism and ideology. Since the concept of private law itself derives from actual legal 
systems, and not from a more abstract theory, it is arguably impossible fully to achieve 
universality and neutrality. Any conception of private law we adopt will inevitably be open 
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perfectly honed scientific instrument, I propose to count as private law any rule or body of 
legal rules that purports to govern legal relationships or disputes between parties who are 
not acting as state officials or bodies. 
We make three observations about this conception of private law. First, the reference 
to ‘legal relationships or disputes’ is designed to cover both contracts, which are first and 
foremost relationships and only exceptionally give rise to disputes, and torts/delicts, which 
are the opposite. Second, we refer to what the rules themselves purport to do and not 
directly to the nature of parties, so that the possibility that a rule might be used additionally 
to govern a relationship between a citizen and the state, for example when the state acts as 
a fisc and not as a sovereign, does not disqualify the rule as a rule of private law. Third, the 
intention of the rider ‘not acting as state officials or bodies’ is to exclude both criminal law 
and public law. This is perhaps the main weak point of the definition, since it presupposes a 
clear legal theory of the state and so we must tolerate some loss of analytical power when 
dealing with systems that lack such a theory. 
The third observation has an important consequence. A literature exists in English 
about what is called ‘civil liability’ for environmental damage.15 The term is, however, 
confusing, since in this context the word ‘civil’ merely means ‘not criminal’. It does not rule 
out regulatory liability, in the sense of duties to pay sums of money to state bodies but not 
to individual victims. Indeed the possibility of regulatory liability has led to the possibly 
strange concept of a ‘civil penalty’, where the sum due exceeds the value of the damage 
caused but the process of imposing it is not ‘criminal’.16 That means that, according to this 
usage, as odd as it might seem to the intellectual descendants of Trebonian, ‘civil’ liability is 
not necessarily liability in private law. For example, the system of regulatory liability 
envisaged by the EU’s Environmental Liability Directive17 is often classified in English- 
speaking jurisdictions as ‘civil’ liability, even though, admittedly after much hesitation, that 
Directive deliberately chose not to create private law rights and duties.18 The confusion is 
reinforced by including within the category of ‘civil liability’ cases of true private law liability, 
for example liability for damage caused by nuclear accidents as required by the Paris 
Convention of 1960 (as implemented by, for instance, the UK’s Nuclear Installations Act 
1965) and cases of combinations of private law and regulatory liability, for example the 
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3 Two Aspects of the Relationship Between Environmental 
Law and Private Law 
Another important distinction is between two different kinds of interaction between 
environmental law and private law. The first kind of interaction starts with private law and 
asks how it might be relevant to the subject matter of environmental law, for example how 
private law might serve to deter or repair environmental damage. The second kind of 
interaction starts with environmental law and asks how it affects private law, for example 
whether environmental regulation is recognized and given effect in private law. The first 
might be called private law as environmental law, the second environmental law in private 
law. The two types of interaction themselves interact. The extent to which a legal system 
allows environmental law to affect private law will help to define the role of private law as 
environmental law in that system. But the two issues are distinct. 
 
3.1 Private Law as Environmental Law 
Private law can act as environmental law in three distinct ways. First, it can facilitate 
agreements that protect the environment. Second, it can grant rights to sue in respect of 
acts or activities that harm the environment. Third, it can refuse to facilitate agreements 
that harm the environment. In most legal systems the first is a matter of contract and 
property law, the second of tort/delict or property law, and the third mainly of contract 
law.20 Jurisdictions vary in the extent to which their systems of private law function in these 
ways. 
 
3.1.1 Agreements Protective of the Environment 
Sceptics about the utility of private law as environmental law point out that many 
environmental problems arise precisely because of the limitations of the concept of 
property.21 Shared environmental interests, such as biodiversity and the climate, belong to 
no one and are thus unprotected by property law. But no reason exists in principle (as 
opposed to political reasons or reasons of practicality) why such interests should not come 
within the scope of property rights.22 Moreover, even if property regimes do not extend to 
such interests, private law in the form of contract law can create obligations to act in 
particular ways about them regardless of whether those acts themselves relate to property 
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rights. In addition, to the extent that such contracts can themselves be securitized, the 
market can treat them as if they were property rights. These possibilities have prompted 
some commentators to claim that we are witnessing a ‘contractualisation’ of environmental 
law.23 Two types of contractualization can be identified: methods that channel self- 
interested behaviour in pro-environmental directions; and methods that help altruistically 
motivated people to fulfil their own pro-environmental goals. 
As an example of the former, we might consider cap-and-trade systems such as the 
European Union’s Emission Trading System (EU ETS). Cap-and-trade systems work through 
the creation of new property rights, for example rights to emit greenhouse gases, which are 
capable of being the subject matter of contracts. The underlying concept is that if one 
engineers a private value for socially beneficial conduct, people will be more likely to act in 
that socially beneficial way. Admittedly, the property rights themselves rest on a base of 
criminal law and regulation. Permits to do something previously allowed can only exist if the 
activity is first made unlawful, and that unlawfulness is usually created by making the 
activity itself a criminal offence unless covered by a permit. But that process is not different 
in kind from the creation of other kinds of property. Property rights in objects, for example, 
are protected not just by private law remedies but also by criminal offences such as theft 
and criminal damage. Indeed, in the modern world criminal law is the primary method for 
making sure that property rights are enforceable not just against counter-parties in 
contracts but against everyone in the world (‘erga omnes’). Even intellectual property 
regimes contain criminal offences.24 One might object that a system of tradable permits is 
different because the relevant offences can be committed by the owners themselves, and 
not exclusively by those who interfere in the owners’ property, but that would be to miss 
the point that those who emit greenhouse gases without sufficient permits are interfering in 
the rights of others who hold permits. It is as if they are using other permit holders’ rights 
without their permission. 
Different legal systems, however, approach the creation of trading schemes in subtly 
different ways. Indeed the differences between legal systems in the EU was acknowledged 
in the Directive setting up the EU ETS.25 The detailed implementation of the system was left 
to the Member States’ own legal systems, subject to the requirement that each Member 
State must provide for equal treatment of permits created in other Member States. 
Differences include how particular systems create property rights that exist only for a 
certain length of time and which in some circumstances are defeasible by administrative 
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litigation alongside and possibly in conflict with basic provisions of private law.26 In France, 
for example, the Conseil d’Etat has decided that the public authority has extensive powers 
to revoke ETS permits issued as a result of a mistake by an operator,27 but that raises the 
issue of what happens in private law if the operator had sold some of its permits to a third 
party and of the public law consequences if the third party suffers a loss. More generally, in 
systems such as the French, which draw strong distinctions between public and private 
property, the former being to some extent inalienable, explicit provision is required to 
ensure tradability.28 
Another challenge for the EU ETS has been divergences between Member States about 
whether allowances are to be treated as ‘goods’ or not.29 The French Code de 
l’environnement declares that ETS permits are ‘biens meubles’ but that is not the case in 
other jurisdictions. The UK legislation, the Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Scheme 
Regulations 2012, is characteristically silent, since British legislation usually strives as far as 
possible to avoid matters of legal classification, but the courts have slipped easily into 
treating allowances as legitimate objects of ordinary contract law.30 The Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive 2014 (MiFID II) treats all contracts in EU ETS allowances, including 
spot contracts, as financial instruments and thus subject to the relevant regulatory regime, 
albeit with some relaxation of its requirements for operators of relevant installations as 
opposed to traders in permits. 
In the United States, because of concerns about triggering constitutional doctrines 
about expropriation, legislation creating emissions trading systems has tended to say that 
permits are not to be treated as property but nevertheless that they can be possessed and 
transferred.31 The apparent contradictions in this position serve only to reinforce the point 
that legislatures are at liberty to abuse the basic concepts of private law if that is what they 
want to do in the pursuit of their policy goals. 
Turning to the latter type of ‘contractualization’, giving greater effect to altruistic 
action, we might point to the example of ‘conservation covenants’.32 The idea is that 
covenants or easements on land can be used to promote conservation, for example to 
preserve biodiversity. The owner accepts restrictions in the interests of conservation on 
what the owner can do on the land, restrictions enforceable by another party, for example a 
non-governmental organization (NGO) with an interest in conservation or an individual 
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philanthropist. Crucially the obligation that ‘runs with the land’, in the sense that it is 
enforceable not just as a contract between the original parties but also against any future 
owner of the land. In many legal systems, such covenants face the difficulty that only 
obligations that benefit neighbouring land are permitted to ‘run with the land’, so severely 
limiting the circumstances in which they work.33 But in several jurisdictions in the United 
States, and in Scotland, legislatures have intervened to make such covenants possible even 
in the absence of benefit to neighbouring land.34 Furthermore, the Law Commission for 
England and Wales has recommended the adoption of a similar rule in that jurisdiction.35 
 
3.1.2 Private Legal Actions in Respect of Environmental Harm 
The second way in which private law can act as environmental law is by granting rights to 
prevent or to demand compensation for environmental damage. This is the domain not so 
much of contract law as of tort or delict (or in some jurisdictions property law). The 
paradigm example is the law of nuisance or troubles anormaux de voisinage, under which 
claimants have under certain conditions a right to stop activities by others that degrade 
their environment. But claimants might also be able to establish liability on the basis of 
more general principles, for example the principle found in many legal systems that 
claimants can recover compensation from anyone who harms them intentionally or by 
negligence, a principle recognized to a greater or lesser degree by, for example, Articles 
1240 and 1241 (previously 1382 and 1383) of the French Civil Code, § 823 of the German 
BGB, and the English and American tort of negligence. In addition, some legal systems 
provide for strict liability for damage caused by things under the control of the defendant, 
for example Article 1242 (previously 1384) of the French Civil Code and the US (though not 
the English) interpretation of the ‘Rule in Rylands v Fletcher’ as establishing strict liability for 
‘inherently dangerous (or ultrazardous) activity’.36 German law also provides for a form of 
strict liability but by specific statutory provision rather than in the general law, including the 
Environmental Liability Act of 1990, which I here classify as ‘Environmental Law in Private 
Law’ rather than ‘Private Law as Environmental Law’. 
The degree to which these legal rules facilitate environmental protection through 
private law litigation depends on a number of factors, which themselves vary across legal 
systems.37 They include: (1) who can sue; (2) who can be sued; (3) what forms of damage 
are actionable; (4) what are the conditions of liability; (5) how causation can be established; 
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3.1.2.1 Who Can Sue 
On who can sue, systems impose very few restrictions in their general fault-based delicts 
apart from the requirement that claimants have to have suffered actionable damage, but in 
nuisance and its equivalents one can find a very wide range of rules. At one end, in Sweden 
no restriction exists, since the Swedish system in principle gives everyone a right to sue for 
violations of the Environmental Code.38 At the other end, in Dutch law, only owners of land 
appear to be protected, a position also reflected in the wording of the German BGB § 906, 
although that provision is usually interpreted as additionally covering those with possessory 
interests.39 The German position is similar to that in England, where possessory interests are 
required in private nuisance, although that also includes interests such as easements that 
would not count universally as possessory.40 Beneficiaries of easements are protected in 
other systems, for example in Catalonia.41 English law does not, however, protect 
contractual licensees,42 whereas Czech and French law does extend to contractual 
licensees.43 French law even protects building contractors.44 
3.1.2.2 Who Can Be Sued 
On who can be sued, the position is similar. In the general fault-based torts, one normally 
finds no limitation, but in the nuisance/troubles anormaux de voisinage torts wide variation 
appears. In Sweden, in effect any violator of the Environmental Code is a potential 
defendant.45 In England the law is unclear, but the better view is that, as in Sweden, no 
limitation exists: anyone who causes a nuisance is liable for it regardless of their own status 
as a landowner.46 In France the same rule seems to apply,47 being implied in the principle 
announced by the courts as governing the cases: ‘nul ne doit causer à autrui un trouble 
anormal de voisinage’.48 In many systems, however, including the Dutch and the Italian, 
liability arises from the idea that a property owner is abusing his or her rights, and so 
liability is confined to owners of the land from which the nuisance emanates.49 Systems also 
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originally based its equivalent of nuisance on the idea of abuse of property rights but has now 
vary in the extent to which they recognize secondary liability. For example, in systems in 
which any person who causes the damage is liable, another question that arises is whether a 
person who contracts for the damage-causing activity to be done is also liable. Similarly 
systems vary about whether landlords are liable for the trouble caused by their tenants.50 A 
related but more general issue on which jurisdictions vary is the question of when, in cases 
in which multiple defendants might be liable, each defendant can be held liable with respect 
to the whole loss, regardless of considerations of relative contributions to the loss, the issue 
of joint and several liability.51 
3.1.2.2.1 Suing the State 
Particular problems arise in using private law to sue the state. Although absolute 
prohibitions on using private law against the state, still the situation in French law, are not 
as common as they were, many jurisdictions still make suing the state more difficult than 
suing private parties. Although much confusion surrounds the issue, state defendants in 
England, for example, have frequently succeeded in persuading courts that no private law 
obligations exist at all where the state is accused of failing to exercise a discretion to take 
more action to prevent harm.52 This is especially the case if the damage flowed from a 
‘policy’ decision of the state, one that involves the political weighing up of the benefits of 
different allocations of public resources. Similar rules exist elsewhere, for example in US 
federal law in which the Federal Tort Claims Act exempts from its scope the ‘exercise or 
performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty’.53 In 
addition, US law, both state and federal, operates under a broad ‘political question’ doctrine 
that immunizes on constitutional grounds controversial policy decisions, for example those 
affecting climate change, from private law challenge.54 
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Those sceptical of the utility of private law as environmental law often point to the third 
factor, actionable forms of damage, to bolster their case.55 Their argument is that private 
law liability systems provide no protection for the environment broadly conceived to cover 
such matters as biodiversity and greenhouse gas emissions.56 To some extent, broader 
environmental interests can be protected by proxy through the protection of narrower 
interests, but the problem is that climate change and reduction of biodiversity are often 
characterized as threats to the health or property of people not yet born and only 
psychologically damaging to those alive now. Indeed, one motive for creating property and 
contractual rights in environmental assets, in the shape of tradeable emissions permits for 
example, is precisely that many private law systems take a narrow view of the types of 
damage recognized by tort law. No such limits exist for the interests protected by contract 
law as long as the interests are lawful. 
It is indeed the case that even in the most generous regime in terms of standing to sue, 
namely Sweden, individual victims may only seek compensation for ‘bodily injury, material 
damage and pecuniary loss’.57 German and English law both limit recovery even in their 
general fault-based torts to specific forms of loss, although German law, in recognizing the 
right to a continuing business is more generous than English law in its treatment of pure 
economic loss and is clearer in its protection of personal freedom.58 The degree of 
recognition of psychological harm also varies, from some US states in which any kind of 
mental distress is potentially actionable to the somewhat incoherent hostility to ‘secondary’ 
psychiatric damage in England.59 
In the more specific nuisance tort, English law is even more restrictive, excluding all 
liability for personal injury and interruption of pleasant vistas.60 Liability for interference in 
other matters, for example light, can only be established if the claimant has established a 
specific property right to those amenities.61 English law also denies protection for the flow 
of air in the form of breezes and the wind,62 so that in English law the operator of a wind 
farm would have no action against a neighbour whose activities interfered with the flow of 
air to the wind turbines. Other systems, however, provide for the protection a long list of 
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legislator has forgotten to mention, as in the Swedish Environment Code,63 although it is not 
clear whether the eiusdem generis clause would protect the flow of wind to wind farms. 
 
3.1.2.4 Conditions of Liability 
The heart of a private law action is the liability rule itself: in what circumstances is the 
defendant’s conduct to be treated as actionable? The most common rule in the general 
torts and often used in more specific torts is an objective fault rule, namely that a 
reasonable person in the position of the defendant would have acted differently. The US 
courts have broken down the standard into three factors in a way that has influenced many 
other systems: 
The degree of care demanded of a person by an occasion is the resultant of three 
factors: the likelihood that his conduct will injure others, taken with the seriousness 
of the injury if it happens, and balanced against the interest which he must sacrifice 
to avoid the risk.64 
English and German law are roughly on that same page,65 although German lawyers seem to 
find objective standards of fault difficult to understand and to think of ‘fault’ as something 
at least residually subjective.66 In addition, English law adds a rider that some risks are so 
low in comparison with the benefits of taking them that the courts believe that they should 
not bother to ask how onerous it would have been to take further preventive measures.67 
3.1.2.4.1 Other Possible Variants on Fault 
In principle, the elements of the standard approach to fault could be varied,68 and as a 
consequence environmental actions might be made easier for claimants. A systematic 
approach to that variation would note that one could (1) replace the foreseeability 
requirement for any of the elements with a test that in effect asks whether it would be 
reasonable for the defendant to act in the same way now, in the light of what we have 
learned since the accident, a rule that was indeed proposed at one time in the United States 
in some product liability cases;69 (2) burdens of proof on any or all of the elements of the 
test could be reversed so that they lie on the defendant rather than the claimant, as in 
liability in French law for hospital-acquired infections;70 and (3) more relevant in actions 
against private parties than actions against the state, the onerousness of further 
 
 
63 Swedish Environment Code Chapter 32, s. 3. 
64 Conway v O’Brien 111 F.2d 611 (1940), at 612 per Learned Hand J. 
65 H. Kerkmeester and L. Visscher, ‘Learned Hand in Europe: a Study in the Comparative Law and 
Economics of Negligence’ (Berkeley C.A.: German Working Papers in Law, 2006). 
66 H. Koziol, Basic Questions of Tort Law from a Germanic Perspective (Vienna: Jan Sramek Verlag, 
2012), 200; Koziol, Basic Questions of Tort Law from a Comparative Perspective, at 783. 
67 Bolton v Stone [1951] AC 850. 
68 See G. Calabresi and A. Klevorick, ‘Four Tests for Liability in Torts’ (1985) 14 Journal of Legal 
Studies 585–627. 
69 Barker v Lull Eng’g Co 20 Cal. 3d 413 (1978); Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp. 90 N.J. 191 
(1982). 
70 Société la clinique Bouchard Cass. Civ. 1re, 21 May 1996. 
precautions could be limited to the costs of further precautions for actors other than the 
defendant, eliminating any purely private cost for the defendant, which is at least a 
plausible account of how a ‘risk-benefit’ test might work in the definition of ‘defect’ in the 
EU Product Liability Directive.71 
3.1.2.4.2 Strict Liability 
Going even further are the strict liability rules to be found in, for example, Article 1242 (ex 
1384) of the French Civil Code and the US ‘ultrahazardous activity’ doctrine, which hold 
those who control ‘things’ (or in the case of the US rule, inherently dangerous things) liable 
without proof of fault for the damage those ‘things’ cause. Japan also seems to follow the 
rule that dangerousness implies strict liability.72 The French rule, whose scope is notoriously 
wide, has been used in an environmental context to impose strict liability, for example, on a 
brewery for contaminating a town’s water supply with waste released in the course of 
demolishing a building.73  The scope of the US rule is much narrower, being often 
interpreted as applying only to activities that cannot be carried on safely regardless of the 
defendant’s degree of care and as not applying to any activity that is ‘normal’ in the purely 
factual sense of widespread. Nevertheless the rule has been used successfully in cases of 
radioactive emissions.74 The US courts trace their rule back to the English case Rylands v 
Fletcher,75 in which the owner of a reservoir serving a factory was held liable without proof 
of fault for the property damage caused when water from the reservoir invaded the 
underground shafts of the claimant’s mine. The court, reflecting, perhaps unconsciously, the 
replacement of a rural society by an industrial one, reasoned from an analogy with cattle 
trespass—that just as the owners of cattle are strictly liable for the damage their animals 
cause if they wander onto other people’s land, so factory owners should be strictly liable if 
their materials wander and cause damage.76 In England, however, the rule in Rylands v 
Fletcher never became a general rule of strict liability for dangerous activities and is 
increasingly treated as merely a sub-species of private nuisance dealing with one-off events 
as opposed to continuing activities.77 The Australian courts, further illustrating the diversity 
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strict liability for dangerousness is not a principle of general tort law but it does appear in 
specific statutes, including the Environmental Liability Act of 1990.79 
3.1.2.4.3 Special Rules in Nuisance/Troubles Anormaux 
In the nuisance or troubles anormaux torts, the liability rule tends to be stricter than in the 
general fault torts. The approach taken by most systems is to ask whether the degree of 
interference is beyond that which a reasonable person in the position of the claimant should 
be expected to tolerate,80 an approach that comes to the question of liability from the point 
of view of the claimant rather than from that of the defendant. Applying this tolerance 
approach usually includes considering the intensity, timing and duration of interference and, 
crucially the type of neighbourhood involved81—in the words of a nineteenth-century 
English court, referring to areas of London that are still very different, ‘What would be a 
nuisance in Belgrave Square would not necessarily be so in Bermondsey’.82 Some systems, 
particularly the Swedish and the German systems, assess levels of reasonable toleration by 
applying regulatory standards. Others, for example the English system, use regulatory 
standards merely as guides. Most systems employ a ‘hypersensitive claimant’ rule, under 
which an interference does not become unreasonable just because of unusual 
vulnerabilities of the claimant.83 Interestingly, systems seem to adopt the reasonable 
tolerance approach whether they come to the problem as a matter of the law of obligations 
or as a matter of the law of property. 
Some systems use a more defendant-centred fault-like standard at least for some 
purposes—for example English law uses a slightly modified fault standard when the damage 
was caused by a third party or by natural causes on the defendant’s land,84 and Spanish law, 
outside Catalonia, has no specific nuisance action and so applies the standards of the 
general torts.85 Some systems make a distinction between physical encroachment on and 
damage to land, in which liability is close to absolute with very few excuses or defences 
available, and annoyances that do not involve physical encroachment or damage, in which 
the tolerance rule applies.86 In England, for example, nuisance including an element of 
physical encroachment cannot be justified by the nature of the neighbourhood.87 It is worth 
mentioning, however, that nuisance by encroachment is difficult to distinguish from 
trespass to land, at least without referring back to historical distinctions between types of 
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action that have no modern resonance or use. As ever, English law suffers from its lack of a 
straightforward vindicatio,88 and has produced an excess of substitutes for it. 
The defendant’s conduct is not strictly relevant in a tolerance standard, since the 
determinative issue is the degree of interference from the claimant’s point of view. But it 
might become relevant at least indirectly in systems that recognise a ‘reciprocity’ or ‘normal 
behaviour’ rule. English law is such a system.89 A reciprocity rule says that no one can sue 
for interference at a level they would want themselves to be allowed to make. A normal 
behaviour rule is that no one can sue for activities considered normal by reasonable people, 
the underlying thought being that a reasonable person in the position of the claimant would 
not object to a neighbour pursuing reasonable objectives in a reasonable way. These rules, 
especially in their objective form, allow courts to compare the interests of the parties. They 
also provide a functional equivalent to the concept of abuse of right in those systems that 
lack such a concept. If the defendant targets the claimant maliciously, for no good reason, a 
reasonable person in the position of the claimant would give no weight to the defendant’s 
purposes. 
One challenge the tolerance standard faces in the environmental law context is that it 
might fail to lead to liability in cases of cumulative effects over large populations and over 
long periods of time. It is possible to envisage situations in which the degree of interference 
for each individual claimant might be small enough to be tolerable but the long term 
cumulative effect on, for example, biodiversity or climate might be very great. 
3.1.2.4.4 Private Law Liability Rules and the Polluter-Pays Principle 
Some commentators believe that all the liability rules in use in private law, with the possible 
exception of strict liability under Article 1242 of the French Civil Code and its equivalents, 
are inadequate as environmental law because they fail to respect the polluter-pays 
principle.90 The basic point they make is that both fault-based liability and tolerance-based 
liability allow polluters to escape having to pay. That seems difficult to deny in the case of 
fault-based liability in its classic ex ante form, since under that rule polluters do not pay for 
pollution where the cost of avoiding it would have seemed too high at the time, regardless 
of how matters turned out. In the case of tolerance-based liability, however, one might 
counter that the defendant’s argument is not that the pollution was justified at the time but 
that, according to the standards of the society concerned, what has taken place should not 
count as ‘pollution’ and so the defendant is not a ‘polluter’. That arguably remains so even if 
we admit arguments based on reciprocity or normal behaviour, since the position is still that 
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Claimants in private law tort actions invariably need to prove that a causal link can be made 
between the damage they have suffered and the defendant. Causation is two issues rather 
than one, although some systems run the two together. The first issue (often called ‘factual 
causation’) is whether one can identify a factual link between the damage and the 
defendant’s actions, for which the usual starting point is whether the harm would have 
happened but for the defendant’s tort.91 The second (often called ‘legal causation’), which is 
possibly better analysed under recognized damage or conditions of liability, is whether the 
defendant should take responsibility for a specific consequence. Both issues are relevant in 
both the general fault-based torts and the nuisance/troubles anormaux torts. 
3.1.2.5.1 Factual Causation 
The factual link issue is one of those parts of the law that works better in practice than in 
theory. In theory it is full of problems and puzzles, most of which arise out of the difficulty of 
understanding causation of a particular event in a particular case without specifying a 
counterfactual, that is without mentally varying some aspect of the sequence of events as 
they actually happened and asking what would have happened in those different 
circumstances.92 In fault-based torts it is tolerably straightforward to specify the 
counterfactual. The claimant normally has to show that if the defendant had acted properly, 
that is if the defendant had reached the required standard of behaviour, the claimant would 
not have suffered the damage.93 Although several ways of meeting the standard might exist, 
the defendant is not required to have gone beyond minimal compliance and so the ‘lawful 
alternative’ used in analysis is usually the one least onerous for the defendant. In the case of 
strict liability, however, although often treated as self-evident, the concept of factual 
causation is theoretically rather unclear, since it is not obvious which counterfactual one 
should choose. Is it what would happened if the defendant had done nothing, or if the 
defendant had done something else, and if the latter, which something else? Doing nothing 
is not necessarily the least burdensome option for the defendant since the defendant will 
often have engaged in the activity as part of a profit-making business. Factual causation 
under the tolerance rule is also not entirely clear. If one asks what would have happened 
had the defendant acted properly one immediately undermines the claimant-centred nature 
of the test. But if one starts with the point of view of the claimant it is not clear which 
counterfactual one should choose. In practice, however, both in strict liability versions of 
the general tort and in nuisance/troubles de voisinage the counterfactual chosen, or 
perhaps merely presupposed, is that the defendant did not engage in any activity at all. 
But even ignoring the issue of which counterfactual to choose, factual causation creates 
other obstacles for claimants. Typically environmental problems involve multiple potential 
polluters and multiple potential victims. It is often difficult for individual claimants to show 
that the damage they suffered was caused by the actions or activities of specific defendants. 
A further complication comes if a certain degree of pollution is considered acceptable, 
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which might allow some or even all polluters to claim that taken by itself their particular 
contribution would have been insufficient for the threshold to have been crossed. Another 
argument arises in cases in which the threshold would have been crossed by the individual 
contributions of more than one polluter by themselves, allowing each of them to claim that 
actionable damage would have occurred anyway even if they had not made their own 
contribution. 
Systems vary in their response to these difficulties. Some offer claimants very little help, 
at least in the general torts, although some of those systems, such as the German, offer help 
instead through ‘environmental law in private law’, for example by creating a presumption 
of causation where individuals sue for compensation arising out of breaches of specific 
protective statutes such as the Environmental Liability Act.94 Other systems offer a great 
deal of help in the general law. French law, for example, in addition to creating a legal 
presumption of causality where the defendant has committed a criminal offence, has a 
concept of collective fault for situations in which the same damage is caused by more than 
one defendant, allowing the claimant to sue any of the group without having to identify all 
of the possible defendants.95 Moreover, the Cour de cassation decided that in a situation 
where one of two defendants must have caused the damage but it was not clear which one, 
each was liable unless it could prove it was not the cause,96 a solution similar to that 
developed in North America.97 Even the English courts have held that where, because of the 
existence of multiple possible causes, it is inherently impossible for the claimant to establish 
causation with regard to one defendant, the claimant is allowed to show merely that the 
defendant was at fault and that fault of that type materially increases the risk of the harm 
occurring.98 In the United States courts in some states have created a form of liability in 
which defendants who each have contributed to a risk by manufacturing a dangerous 
product that harmed a large number of claimants but where the market share of each was 
less than 50 per cent, so that one could not say that it was more probable than not that any 
of the defendants caused the harm, the defendants should all be held liable in proportion to 
their market share.99 Specifically for the nuisance tort, the English courts have long applied a 
rule that if more than one person contributes to creating a nuisance, all are liable, even if 
the degree of interference created by each of them would not have amounted to a 
nuisance.100 In addition the French courts have taken the lead in solving causation problems 
by recognizing a lost chance of avoiding recognized damage as itself a recoverable form of 
damage.101 
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Turning to the second aspect of causation, the attribution of responsibility, the standard 
issue is whether, in particular in the light of other causes of the harm, to limit the legal 
responsibility of a defendant whose actions or activities admittedly caused harm in a factual 
sense. A common limitation is to restrict responsibility to ‘foreseeable’ consequences of the 
defendant’s actions or activities,102 but systems tend to ignore the foreseeability criterion 
where the harm was unforeseeable only in extent rather than in kind and where the reason 
for the lack of foreseeability was an unusual weakness or vulnerability in the claimant (the 
‘eggshell skull’ rule or the rule that defendants must take claimants as they find them).103 
Many systems also ignore the foreseeability limitation where the defendant is guilty of 
intentional harm, adopting the rule that intended consequences are never too remote. 
Some systems find defendants liable where they have created a risk that someone else 
might harm the claimant even where the defendant is not responsible for the acts of the 
third party on some other ground, for example where the defendant is the third party’s 
employer. On the other hand, other systems exonerate defendants where the third party’s 
intervention deliberately and wrongfully took advantage of the situation created by the 
defendant even where the intervention was foreseeable.104 
The foreseeability restriction is particularly controversial in nuisance or troubles 
anormaux torts. Given the tolerance rule, it is not at all clear why the foreseeability of 
damage from the point of view of the defendant should be relevant. The test is whether the 
degree of interference as it turned out to affect the claimant is one a reasonable person in 
the position of the claimant would tolerate, not whether a reasonable person in the position 
of the defendant would have started the activity in the first place. Nevertheless some 
systems insist on foreseeability.105 As a purely practical matter, however, since in most 
nuisance or troubles anormaux cases the matter has only reached the courts because the 
defendant has refused to stop the activity even after the claimant has complained about it, 
any foreseeability requirement will automatically have been fulfilled. 
 
3.1.2.6 Remedies 
In most systems successful claimants can obtain a court order, enforceable by penal 
measures, that the offending activity should cease or at least be reduced to the tolerance 
level, together with monetary compensation for recognized damage caused before the 
activity stops.106 In some systems an injunction or court order is the primary remedy and 
claims for damages need to be filed separately under separate tort theories that may or may 
not succeed even if the action for an injunction has succeeded.107 In contrast, in England the 
action for damages is primary and the injunction remedy discretionary. Until 2014, however, 
the injunction was treated as almost automatic. Since then English law has joined Germany 
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and many US states in saying that injunctions can be refused if the public interest 
requires.108 A similar though lesser effect arises if the court suspends the injunction until the 
defendant no longer needs to continue the nuisance-causing activity.109 
These possibilities of refusing or suspending injunctions in turn raise a further question 
of how the level of compensation should be affected by the refusal or suspension of the 
injunction, since damages in respect of the future are a very different matter from damages 
in respect of the past. In effect, the defendant is being allowed to expropriate the claimant’s 
interest and so should be required to buy out that interest at a reasonable price set by the 
court. In Sweden, the law takes this thought to its logical conclusion and provides that 
victims of nuisances that render properties ‘unprofitable to the owner, wholly  or  in  part, 
or great detriment  arises  in  connection  with  its  use’ are entitled to require the 
defendant to buy out their interest at a value set by the statute on expropriation.110  
Another possibility, much discussed in the economic literature, is that instead of the court 
refusing an injunction and ordering ‘permanent’ damages, the court grants the injunction 
but requires the claimant to make an off-setting payment to the defendant, to recompense 
the defendant for having to cease an otherwise beneficial activity.111 
 
3.1.2.7 Particular Problems of Climate Change Litigation 
Although the utility of tort/delictual liability for environmental protection purposes varies 
with the choices a system makes on each of the elements of liability, a consensus was 
growing that, despite some initial optimism,112 delictual liability was not well-suited to 
litigating long-term problems such as climate change. US-based litigation, for example, 
eventually failed through a combination of problems around the immunity of state bodies 
and causation, in particular claimants having to show that they have suffered damage that 
would not have happened had the specific defendant acted differently in a specific way.113 A 
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The Urgenda Foundation, an environmental NGO, brought successful proceedings in the 
Dutch civil courts alleging that the Netherlands government’s climate change policy 
amounted to a tort under Article 6:162 of the Dutch Civil Code. Article 6:162 declares 
tortious ‘an act or omission in violation of a duty imposed by law or of what according to 
unwritten law has to be regarded as proper social conduct’, a standard interpreted by the 
Dutch courts in way that has yielded conditions of liability very close to the standard US 
three-part analysis.115 Usefully for claimants, however, the Dutch courts treat the problems 
of state discretion as a factor in assessing fault rather than as a separate issue. The 
claimants overcame the usual problem of showing that they were suffering recognizable 
damage that a change in behaviour by the defendant would alleviate by arguing that that 
climate change frustrated their primary purpose as an association, which was ‘to stimulate 
and accelerate the transition processes to a more sustainable society’. That meant that the 
future effects of climate change constituted current damage to Urgenda. On appeal the 
court also recognised Urgenda’s interest as a matter of human rights. On causation the 
claimants succeeded at first instance in persuading the court to combine two approaches 
favourable to claimants: that all those who contribute to creating unlawful damage should 
count as having made the damage unlawful; and that a loss of a chance should count as 
recognised damage. On appeal they succeeded on the basis that in Dutch law an applicant 
for an injunction, as opposed to claimant for damages, has to show the existence only of a 
real risk of the relevant harm. 
 
3.1.3 Refusal to Enforce Environmentally Damaging Agreements 
The third way in which private law can act as environmental law is by refusing to enforce 
otherwise enforceable voluntary arrangements, such as contracts or trusts, on the ground 
that executing the agreement would have damaging environmental effects. This aspect of 
private law as environmental law is as yet more a theoretical possibility than common 
practice. Moreover its practical effects might not be clear-cut: sociologists since Weber have 
long pointed out that lack of legal enforceability might not deter the making of agreements 
between people who have other reasons to trust one another to perform their 
obligations.116 It is worthwhile, however, to set out how such a legal result might come 
about. 
As the new Article 1162 of the French Code Civil says: ‘Le contrat ne peut déroger à 
l'ordre public ni par ses stipulations, ni par son but, que ce dernier ait été connu ou non par 
toutes les parties’. Two provisions of the German BGB between them produce a similar 
effect: § 134 says, ‘Ein Rechtsgeschäft, das gegen ein gesetzliches Verbot verstößt, ist 
nichtig, wenn sich nicht aus dem Gesetz ein anderes ergibt’ and § 138(1) says, ‘Ein 
Rechtsgeschäft, das gegen die guten Sitten verstößt, ist nichtig’. English law, although in this 





the Climate Case Urgenda Foundation v The State of the Netherlands’ (2016) Journal of Planning 
& Environment Law 323–41. 
115 Kelerluik Hoge Raad, 5 November 1965. 
116 M. Weber, Economy and Society, trans. G. Roth and C. Wittich, vol. 1 (Berkeley C.A.: University of 
California Press, 1978), 336–7. 
contracts that are illegal or against public policy are vulnerable to being found either void or 
unenforceable.117 Similar rules apply to trusts.118 
These provisions raise the question of whether the law can refuse to enforce contracts 
whose terms or objectives involve environmental degradation. Contracts to violate specific 
environmental standards or statutory rules—for example contracts illegally to dump toxic 
waste—would almost certainly fall foul of the rules against illegality or public policy in most, 
if not all, jurisdictions. Contracts of insurance under which insurers provide cover to 
operators against having to pay fines for violations of environmental law are also likely to be 
declared void.119 A wider issue is whether the same result might arise for contracts whose 
terms or objectives facilitate damage to biodiversity or to the climate. Compliance with a 
specific regulatory scheme, the EU ETS for example, would presumably protect contracts 
from illegality or public policy rules, but what about contracts in non-traded sectors? The 
coming into force of the Paris Agreement means that it is difficult to deny that international 
public policy favours urgent action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Some states have 
domestic legislation enshrining greenhouse gas emission targets in law.120 The Urgenda case 
shows that it is at least possible for courts to hold unlawful a specific policy trajectory 
incompatible with avoiding serious damage to the climate. On the other hand parties 
threatened with the voiding of their contracts will presumably argue that, as long as the 
global or relevant national target for non-traded greenhouse gas emissions for the period of 
the contract is greater than the emissions envisioned by the contract, the contract should 
not be treated as contrary to public policy or illegal. It would still be possible, they would 
argue, to fulfil the obligations both of the general law and of the contract. But that leads to 
an interesting problem of cumulative causation: what if the volume of emissions envisaged 
by all the contracts in a jurisdiction taken together exceed the relevant limit? Are all the 
contracts nevertheless valid? What about contracts made in circumstances in which the 
parties knew or should have known that given the volume of emissions already contracted 
for the emissions envisaged by their contract would lead to the limit being exceeded? 
Moreover, what is the effect of the rule in the new French code ‘que ce dernier ait été 
connu ou non par toutes les parties’? In a regime that followed that rule, it is possible that 
all the relevant contracts would be void. 
One problem with the public policy and illegality doctrines of contract law is that their 
invocation is a matter for the parties to the contract rather than for the public authorities. 
As a result parties might be reluctant to raise public policy or illegality points if they are 
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parties to other contracts in which a finding of unenforceability or voidness would be very 
inconvenient. On the other hand, in systems in which the state can make private law 
contracts, for example in the English system, one can envisage a situation in which, 
following a change of government, a state body might look for ways to escape long term 
contracts in the energy sector formed on the basis of the previous government’s policy. This 
scenario is particularly enticing in jurisdictions that treat binding the government’s ability to 
make policy changes in areas of vital national interest as itself a potential ground for 
radically re-construing or voiding its contracts.121 
One question that would arise out of the voiding of energy contracts following a change 
of government is whether the operators would be entitled to compensation. Systems that 
treat contracts under public law differently from private law contracts often compensate 
contractors where the contract is affected by changes in policy,122 but the position in 
jurisdictions in which the state makes only private law contracts might be different. A 
question of classification might also be relevant: is the reason the state can change the 
contract a matter of contractual interpretation, illegality, or lack of contracting capacity? 
That classification will determine whether the affected party will be able to claim reparation 
on the basis of unjustified enrichment. In particular, if the reason is illegality, the contractor 
might be left uncompensated.123 
 
3.1.4 Summary 
The breadth of possibilities across the three examples of private law as environmental law 
and within each example is great and not easy to summarize. We might, however, construct 
two extreme types as a way of clarifying the position. One extreme would be a jurisdiction  
in which the use of private law as environmental law is minimized. The other extreme would 
be where it is maximized. In the first option, no legislative provision would exist to make 
environmental assets such as carbon credits tradeable, conservation contracts would not 
run with the land, no one would have standing to sue in negligence or nuisance for long- 
term environmental damage, remedies would be restricted to money compensation for past 
damage, the conditions of liability would be restricted to fault (perhaps even to intentional 
wrongdoing), causation rules would exclude cumulative causation, the responsibility for 
pollution would be easily diverted to other actors on grounds of lack of foreseeability, 
governments would have immunity from private law actions, and public policy rules in 
contract would require knowing breach of specific legal rules. In the latter, all environmental 
assets would be recognized as tradeable and enforceable against the whole world, standing 
to sue for long-term environmental damage would be granted to all citizens, the primary 
remedy would be injunctions, the liability rule would be strict, cumulative causation would 
be recognized, the transfer of responsibility to others would be restricted to situations of 
deliberate and wrongful intervention (or even eliminated completely), governments would 
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make more difficult the fulfilment of important policy objectives, including long-term 
environmental objectives. Table 1 illustrates these extreme options. 
Table 1 
 
 Minimum Maximum 
Environmental assets Not tradeable Tradeable and enforceable erga 
omnes 
Recognized damage No one has standing to sue 
for long-term environmental 
damage 
Everyone has standing to sue 
for long-term environmental 
damage 
Primary remedy Damages Injunction 
Liability rule Fault Strict 
Factual causation No cumulative causation Cumulative causation 




Government immunity Complete None, even for ‘discretionary’ 
or ‘policy’ decisions 
Public policy rule in 
contract 
Specific knowledge of breach 
necessary 
Knowledge of breach 
unnecessary 
 
No system takes either of these views in its totality and for each variable a number of 
other possible rules exist that lie between the two. But the table gives a rough checklist for 
judging how far a system has gone in adapting its private law for use as environmental law. 
 
3.2 Environmental Law in Private Law 
We now turn to environmental law in private law. The question is how environmental 
regulation that takes forms different from private law, essentially criminal law and 
regulation, interacts with private law. This is potentially a very large topic. Only two 
dimensions of the relationship are taken up here, each of which has a plausible claim to be 
significant. The first is the extent to which private law claimants can invoke environmental 
crimes as a basis for legal actions even if the relevant statute fails to mention the possibility 
of a private law action. The second is the degree to which defendants in private law actions 
can defend themselves by showing that they had complied with environmental regulatory 
standards. 
The two dimensions are linked in the sense that liability on the basis of violation of a 
criminal or regulatory statute is only possible if the crime has actually been committed or 
the regulation broken. But beyond that no purely logical connection exists. It is a matter of 
public and legal policy which combination of rules on these issues a jurisdiction adopts. A 
jurisdiction might, for example, combine saying that environmental crimes automatically 
give rise to torts with saying that regulatory compliance is a defence in tort. In such a 
jurisdiction, determinations made by the state about permitted levels of pollution are 
dominant in private law. But a jurisdiction might instead say that crimes do not 
automatically create torts and that regulatory compliance is not a defence to private law 
actions. In that system private law determines for itself the levels of pollution it will tolerate, 
independent of the views of the state regulatory authorities. Moreover, those are not the 
only possibilities. A jurisdiction could refuse to allow private law actions on crimes but at the 
same time allow regulatory compliance to be a defence in private law. A jurisdiction could 
even allow private law actions on crimes but refuse to make regulatory compliance a 
defence to its general torts. 
It might be objected that the combination of no torts on crimes plus allowing a 
regulatory compliance defence makes no sense. Criminal polluters will be prosecuted 
anyway so why not reinforce the deterrent by adding in the prospect of damages? The 
counter is that in systems that give prosecutors a broad discretion to refuse to prosecute 
(some do not give such a discretion, notably Germany) the point of the combination is not 
to prevent pollution but quite the opposite: it is consistently to protect potential polluters 
from legal interventions from anyone except the state. 
The final combination, torts on crimes but no regulatory compliance defence, might 
draw the opposite criticism that if private claimants can bring to a halt activities the 
regulatory system allows, the regulatory system would be undermined. In addition, if the 
defendant commits no crime because it has a permit and thus no tort arises on the crime, 
why should the permit not also undermine any other action against the defendant? But the 
combination does make sense if the courts in that jurisdiction have a power to refuse or 
suspend injunctions in exchange for enhancing compensation. The policy intention behind 
the combination would be to put extra pressure on polluters through allowing tort actions 
on environmental crimes but also to ensure that polluters who benefit from regulatory 
permissions have to compensate those whom their activities harm even when they commit 
no crime.124 
A rough and ready way of understanding the possibilities, ignoring the subtleties of the 
law we are about to sketch, is given in Table 2. 
Table 2 
 
 Regulatory compliance a defence in private law? 
Yes No 
Environmental Yes State determinations Pollutees compensated for 
crime  dominant in private law consequences of state action 
automatically 
a tort? 
   
No State protects polluters from 
private law actions 
Private law determinations 
dominant in its own sphere 
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The general relationship between criminal law and tort/delict varies to a very great degree 
across legal systems,125 and even within the same system.126 The variation is not a simple 
matter of common law systems versus civilian systems or codified versus non-codified 
systems. One of the biggest differences is between English law and the law of most US 
states, even though all these jurisdictions purportedly trace their law back to the same (and 
much misunderstood) nineteenth-century English case.127 In English law the very existence 
of a criminal penalty in a statute creates an initial presumption that the statute was not 
intended to create a tort.128 In the United States, the opposite is the case.129 
Liability regimes differ across a number of variables.130 They include: Is it a condition of 
liability that the criminal statute can be interpreted as protecting the interests of the 
claimant or people like the claimant? Are the types of loss the same or different from those 
in the general fault torts or the nuisance/troubles torts? Do the elements of liability in the 
crime determine in whole or in part the liability rule in the tort, and in particular do strict 
liability crimes produce strict liability torts? Are causation rules the same or different from 
other torts? Does the violation of a criminal standard result in the same levels of 
compensation as in private law, or less? 
The requirement that the criminal statute must be interpreted as protective of the 
claimant’s interests before it can be used to create a tort is a common but not universal 
rule.131 It is a characteristic of Germanic legal systems.132 It is less apparent in French- 
derived systems, largely as a result of their use of the procedural device of the partie civile, 
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England and the law of the US states, protectiveness appears as a formal requirement for 
liability but in the United States many examples can be found of it being disregarded.134 
On types of loss, normally the same restrictions apply as in tort law generally, even in 
those systems, such as the German and the Swedish, which have explicit environmental 
liability laws that envisage tort liability on the basis of breaches of environmental 
regulation.135 One peculiarity, however, is the situation in English law under the crime of 
public nuisance. Public nuisance is a common law crime of uncertain scope that can be used 
to base actions in tort of even more uncertain scope.136 The crime is said to consist of doing 
anything, except by lawful authority, that endangers ‘the life, health, property, morals, or 
comfort of the public, or to obstruct the public in the exercise or enjoyment of rights 
common to all’. Omissions are also covered if they involve the failure to discharge a legal 
duty. Surprisingly the courts recognize a tort arising out of this crime that can be used by 
anyone who suffers ‘special damage’, which is to say damage more than that suffered by 
members of the public generally.137 Significantly, that special damage can include forms of 
loss not normally recoverable in general tort actions, such as pure economic loss,138 and 
forms of loss not recoverable in ordinary private nuisance actions, such as personal injury.139 
This flexibility of public nuisance encouraged environmental activists in the United States, 
where its origins in criminal law seem to have been forgotten,140 to use it as the basis of 
actions against both public and private organisations for excessive greenhouse gas 
emissions. All these actions have failed, though largely because of constitutional rather than 
private law considerations.141 
The degree to which the elements of the crime or regulatory provision control or 
replace the liability rule of the tort is a much discussed issue in the United States.142 In 
jurisdictions in which the tort claimant sits alongside the criminal prosecutor, however— 
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gap is discernible between the conditions of criminal and delictual liability. The same is true, 
at least in principle, in English law.143 
An important issue is whether the mechanism in effect creates strict or even absolute 
liability torts. The answer is often yes,144 although a prior question is whether a system 
allows strict or absolute crimes in the first place. Some, in particular the German system, 
find the idea of crimes with no mental element difficult to accept.145 Nevertheless some 
writers refer to liability under the German Environmental Liability Act of 1990 as ‘strict’.146 
On causation, the most important departure from the ordinary rules is the rule of the 
German Environmental Liability Act that once a general tendency for the type of 
establishment run by the defendant to cause the relevant type of damage has been 
ascertained a presumption of causation arises, unless the defendant has complied with all 
relevant regulatory requirements.147 
Finally on levels of compensation, if the action on the crime or regulation is treated as a 
tort or delict, levels of compensation should not differ from those obtainable in the ordinary 
torts. In some systems, however, a separate system of compensation operates in the 
criminal courts which bears little or no relation to the tort/delict system. In such systems, 
for example in English law, in criminal court-ordered compensation, because of its limited 
scope and perhaps its requirements to take into account the defendant’s ability to pay, 
compensation amounts can be much lower than tort damages.148 
 
3.2.2 Environmental Regulatory Compliance as a Defence in Private Law 
Actions 
One difference across systems that does appear to map onto the difference between 
common law and civil law is whether regulatory compliance constitutes a defence to private 
law actions. In the United States and in England, regulatory compliance, including 
compliance with zoning or planning regulation, is not usually a defence to a nuisance action, 
in contrast to, for example, the German system, in which regulatory compliance is an 
important defence.149 Regulatory compliance also appears to be a defence in, for example, 
Bulgaria, France, and Italy.150 
On closer inspection, however, the difference becomes somewhat indistinct. The 
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protection against private law actions, Article L. 112.16, is far from comprehensive. It covers 
only activities that can be described as ‘agricole, industrielle, artisanale ou commerciale’ and 
so does not apply to co-proprietors of the same block of flats or, apparently, to golf 
courses.151 Retrospective permissions also do not count.152 On the other side of the divide, 
English law does allow statutory authority to provide a defence and not just where statutes 
expressly say so, for example the statute governing planning permission for national 
infrastructure projects.153 Statutory authority can also work where the necessary implication 
of the statute was to provide a defence, at least as long as the defendant acted without 




The main goal of this chapter has been to demonstrate the great variety of ways in which 
private law and environmental law interact. I hope that it has at least achieved that much. 
But beyond that, I hope it has helped to lay to rest some myths about that interaction. For 
example it is far from true that the form the interaction takes is determined by whether a 
legal system can be classified as ‘common law’ or ‘civil law’. In a few cases, for example 
regulatory compliance as a defence in private law, that classification does seem to mark a 
boundary, but in many other respects it does not. More difference exists within these 
classifications than between them, for example between French and German law and 
between English law and the law of the US states. Moreover, some of the most interesting 
systems, for example the Swedish system, stand aside from the simple civil law/common 
law divide. 
Another myth the chapter helps to lay to rest is that the relationship between private 
law and environmental law is necessarily antagonistic. No doubt an antagonistic relationship 
is possible and has occurred from time to time in various places, but so are other types of 
more cooperative relationship. A complete melding of the two is perhaps not likely, since 
private law can be used for a variety of goals to which environmental law is largely 
indifferent—the vindication of property rights, for example, or the achievement of 
corrective justice—but that variety of goals in private law is just as likely to result in friction 
inside private law as in friction with environmental law. 
The final myth is that policy-makers are faced with fixed private law systems and that 
their only options for dealing with the relationship between private law and environmental 
law lie in the latter. As Table 1 illustrates, policy-makers possess a large number of options 
in private law too. No doubt legislators need to be careful in making new combinations that 
they have taken into account all of benefits of the status quo and that they have also taken 
into account possible consequential effects on other parts of the private law system, but 
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The last point to make, however, is addressed more to environmental lawyers than to 
private lawyers. As Table 2 illustrates, one cannot assume that state policy takes into 
account only environmental goals. More specifically one cannot classify state policy crudely 
as either pro- or anti-environment. Combinations of rules that appear contradictory when 
analysed from that simple point of view might have a broader logic if one takes other goals 
into account. Environmental lawyers are entitled as citizens to campaign for whatever 
environmental goals they espouse but as legal analysts they should not forget those other 
goals. 
